We study a basic auction design problem with online supply. There are two unit-demand bidders and two types of items. The first item type will arrive first for sure, and the second item type may or may not arrive. The auctioneer has to decide the allocation of an item immediately after each item arrives, but is allowed to compute payments after knowing how many items arrived. For this problem we show that there is no deterministic truthful and individually rational mechanism that, even with unbounded computational resources, gets any finite approximation factor to the optimal social welfare.
Introduction
We consider a fundamental auction design problem with online supply. There are two unit-demand bidders and two types of items. The first item type will arrive first for sure, and the second item type may or may not arrive. The auctioneer has to decide the allocation of an item immediately after each item arrives, but is allowed to compute payments after knowing how many items arrived. The auctioneer's goal is to optimize social welfare.
Relevance of the model. We study the two bidder, two item setting as that is the simplest problem for which we don't yet know the answer. With the natural extension to many buyers and many items, our model is quite close to how online advertising works. Advertisers specify bids for possible item types ahead of time. Items, which are ad opportunities, arrive online and must be allocated immediately upon arrival, as they perish otherwise. Payments can be computed at the end: advertisers are usually billed at regular intervals. The model can be easily extended to include capacity constraints larger than one and/or budget constraints. Optimizing social welfare is an important objective even for a for-profit seller in a competitive environment, as keeping consumers happy in the long-run is crucial.
Closely related work. Auctions where the supply is unknown and arrives online is a topic that has not been explored too much. We discuss the results closest to our work here. Towards the end of this section, we discuss the broader landscape of online mechanisms and algorithms inspired by internet advertising.
1. Babaioff et al. [6] study an online auction setting with two major differences: they study a singleparameter setting (identical items arrive online) and, the auctioneer has to compute payments immediately after each item arrives. Even with the stringent requirement of computing payments online, a trivial deterministic auction obtains an n approximation in this setting, and they construct a simple universally truthful "powers-of-2" randomized mechanism that obtains an O(log n) approximation. On the negative side, they show that no randomized mechanism can achieve a factor better than O(log log n) approximation. They also study a stochastic arrival setting where the mechanism is provided with a distribution over the number of items that arrive online. If the distribution satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, they give a truthful mechanism with an O(1) approximation, again with payments computed online.
2. Goel et al. [20] study a setting similar to that of Babaioff et al. [6] , but instead of the unit demand constraint, each bidder has a budget constraint which specifies a hard upper bound on the bidder's total payment across all items. The goal is now to get a Pareto optimal allocation, rather than approximating the social welfare. Goel et al. [20] show that the adaptive clinching auction of Dobzinski et al. [15] actually achieves this, in the adversarial arrival model. This auction is truthful, and payments can be computed online too.
3. Mahdian and Saberi [24] and Devanur and Hartline [11] consider a similar setting, with identical items, with the revenue maximization objective, and show O(1) approximation ratios, for unit demand bidders, in the adversarial model. The payments are allowed to be computed at the end.
Our Model
The multi-parameter difference: We are not aware of any previous work that studies multi-parameter mechanisms with unknown online supply. All the work summarized above consider multiple copies of a single item. In this paper, we consider multiple heterogeneous items. We study the simplest instantiation of this model when there are just two item types and two unit-demand bidders (if any of these numbers is made 1, the problem is easy or solved: with one bidder, welfare maximization is trivial, and with one item type, we reduce the problem to previous work mentioned above). We investigate this model where the first item type arrives first for sure, and the second item type may or may not arrive. This is the only uncertainty in supply that exists in the model. Items must be allocated online, and the objective is to maximize social welfare.
Lazy payment computation:
To counter-balance the difficulty introduced by the multi-parameter nature of the problem, we allow the auctioneer to compute payments at the end, after knowing whether one item arrived, or two items arrived. Note that with this simplicity, the setting in [6] becomes trivial: when payments are computed at the end, one can implement the VCG mechanism in a single-parameter setting by giving the item in every round to the remaining bidder with the highest bid, and if k items arrive in total, charge v k+1 to all allocated bidders at the end. Nevertheless, even with the luxury of lazy payment computation and the presence of just two item types and two bidders, our problem continues to be non-trivial.
Some examples. Our first steps in this problem were to try some trivial mechanisms that looked promising to give a 2 approximation or close, given that there are two bidders and two item types.
Here are a few examples that we encourage the reader to work out and see what's good or bad about them before proceeding further. Let v = (v 1 , v 2 ) be the bids of bidder V for items 1 and 2, and similarly let w = (w 1 , w 2 ) be the bids of bidder W .
Example 1: Greedy algorithm. It is well known [17] that the following online greedy algorithm gets a competitive ratio of 2 for unit demand bidders, for the purely optimization problem without incentives, even with n bidders and m items. The algorithm assigns each item to the bidder with the highest marginal valuation, i.e., if bidder i is currently assigned a set of items, the maximum item of which he values at v i , and his value for the new item is v i , then his marginal valuation for item i is v i − v i . Do there exist payments that make this assignment truthful?
Example 2: min{m, n} approximation algorithm. Assign each item to the highest bidder for that item. As an algorithm, this gets a factor of min{m, n}, where m is the number of items and n is the number of agents. Do there exist payments that make it truthful?
Example 3: Bundling mechanism. Whenever any bidder gets any item, he pays the max of other bidders' bids. When item 1 arrives, assign it to a bidder if her bid for the first item exceeds the maximum of the other bidder's bids for both items. When item 2 arrives, assign it to the winner of item 1 if any. If no bidder won item 1, assign item 2 to the bidder whose second item bid exceeds the maximum of the other bidder's bids. Is this truthful? What is the approximation factor? Question: Is there a deterministic truthful+IR mechanism that, even with unbounded computational resources, gets a finite approximation factor to social welfare? Is there a deterministic truthful + IR mechanism that satisfies consumer sovereignty: that for any pair of bidder and item, there is a high enough bid that ensures that that bidder is allocated that item?
Our main result is an impossibility result: There is no deterministic truthful+IR mechanism that, even with unbounded computational resources, can get any finite approximation to social welfare. This rules out approximation ratios that grow as a function of the number of bidders n, or the number of items m. This shows a drastic contrast w.r.t the problem with a single item (with multiple copies), where we can implement the optimal allocation when payments are computed at the end. Even in the more stringent case where the payments are required to be computed on the fly, as in Babaioff et al. [6] , the difference in approximation ratios is stark: O(n) vs. ∞.
The answer to the second question is yes, and the mechanism given in Example 5 can be generalized so that it is truthful and satisfies consumer sovereignty.
Techniques and difficulties:
Characterizing truthful mechanisms, even in a multi-dimensional setting, is fairly well understood in the case of a single agent [29, 2, 30, 19] . Equivalently, when the bids of the other agents are fixed, the allocation of an agent as a function of his bids are well understood. With the requirement that the allocation be online, a similar characterization can still be shown with a little carefulness. However, this is not enough. We need to reason about how the allocation function of one agent changes with the changes in the other agent's report. Truthfulness for a single agent by itself is insufficient to restrict this. The restrictions come from a combination of the characterization of the single agent allocation function with the fact that (a) you cannot allocate the item to both agents, and (b) you cannot also throw away items when the values are too high. Careful consideration of certain regions of the type space allows us to make sure both items are always allocated. Then one can make statements such as, if the allocation of one buyer changes from both items to item 1, then the allocation of the other buyer must change from none to item 2. Finally, we consider a chain of such arguments to arrive at the conclusion that no truthful mechanism can get any finite approximation.
Towards positive results and the power of randomness
In the largely unexplored space of online mechanisms for multi-parameter bidders, we ask the first question that anyone would ask, and show a strong impossibility result. Our results point toward what might be reasonably expected in terms of truthfulness for an online mechanism. For instance, it says that there must be some source of randomness for a mechanism to be able to guarantee any reasonable social welfare. In this regard, there are several interesting directions that our work opens up. There are three prominent sources of randomness: a) Randomized mechanisms b) Stochastic arrival and c) Bayesian setting (values drawn from a distribution). For each of these sources of randomness, without using the other sources of randomness, what is the optimal approximation factor one can get? Let n be the number of bidders and m be the number of items that could possibly arrive (lesser number of items could arrive too).
Randomized mechanisms
It is easy to get a min{n, m} approximation with a randomized mechanism. Choosing one of the n bidders uniformly at random and allocating all items to her gives an n approximation. Choosing one of the m items uniformly at random, and selling that item using a second price auction, throwing away all other items gives a factor m approximation (note that the adversary who decides the supply doesn't know the mechanism's coin toss). Is there a mechanism that gets anything better than this trivial min{m, n} approximation? What is the best approximation factor one can get? Logarithmic? Constant? Note that the constant factor impossibility result of Babaioff et al. [6] doesn't apply here because we allow payments to be computed after knowing the entire supply.
Stochastic arrival
What happens if we allow arrival to be stochastic, according to a known distribution, but ask for mechanisms to be deterministic? For the 2 bidder, 2 item setting we studied, here is a stochastic arrival model. Item 1 arrives for sure, and item 2 arrives with a known probability p. If all we ask for is a truthful-inexpectation mechanism, then one can get the optimal welfare by just implementing the VCG mechanism, namely, compute max{v 1 + pw 2 , w 1 + pv 2 }. If the former is larger, bidder V gets 1 and W gets 2, and if the latter is larger, bidder V gets 2 and W gets 1. Truthful payments are easy to compute.
But what if we ask for universal truthfulness over the stochasticity in arrival? For the simple setting of 2 bidders and 2 items, there is a 2 approximation mechanism that allocates the first item to bidder
When second item arrives, offer it to bidder V at a price of max{ w 1 p , w 2 } + (v 1 − max{w 1 , pw 2 }) + and similarly offer it to bidder W at a price of max{
Whoever wins the second item pays the posted price and nothing more, even if they won the first item. If bidder V wins the first item alone (either because the second item doesn't arrive, or because he lost it), he pays max{w 1 , pw 2 } and similarly when bidder W wins the first item alone, he pays max{v 1 , pv 2 }. It is easy to check that this mechanism is truthful, and gets a 2 approximation. Basically, the mechanism is guaranteed to get a welfare of max{v 1 , w 1 , pv 2 , pw 2 }, which gives a 2 approximation. Is there a natural generalization of this mechanism to n bidders and m items that gives a min{m, n} approximation? Are there are better approximations?
Bayesian setting
What if bidders' values are drawn from a (known) joint distribution? If the bidder's distributions are independent, how good an approximation factor can we get with deterministic mechanisms? With randomized mechanisms can we get much better than the trivial min{m, n} approximation factor? With the further restriction that the distributions across items are independent too, what are the best factors possible? We currently don't have answers to these questions even for the 2 bidder 2 item case.
Related Work
Online advertising has been the dominant driver of the internet economy, accounting for almost all the revenue of two of the most important technology companies today, Google and Facebook. It has been the motivation for numerous lines of research, most prominently online matching and its generalizations [26, 8, 12, 14, 18, 17, 25] , and various aspects of auction design [32, 16, 1, 27] . These two have largely remained separate: online algorithms ignore strategic considerations and auction design mostly considers a static setting. It is natural to combine the two aspects, and ask for mechanisms that are both online and truthful, and many papers have done so, but capturing different aspects than us [7, 5, 4, 13] , in particular considering the case where bidders arrive and depart online [23, 21, 22, 3, 10, 28] .
Main Result
Throughout the rest of the paper, we consider two bidders V, W . There are two possible items, 1, 2. Bidder V has type v = (v 1 , v 2 ), where v i is his value for item i. Similarly bidder W has a type w = (w 1 , w 2 ). Both bidders are unit-demand. Item 1 arrives in the first period. Item 2 may or may not arrive in the second period.
A mechanism is defined by its allocation and payment functions. We focus on deterministic mechanisms: the functions x V i : R 2 + × R 2 + → {0, 1} and x W i : R 2 × R 2 → {0, 1} denote the allocation of item i to bidders V and W respectively, as a function of their (4-tuple) bids in R 2 + × R 2 + . Similarly p V (v, w) and p W (v, w) denote the payments of bidders V and W as a function of their bids. We use R + to denote the set of positive real numbers union 0. We require the mechanism to irrevocably decide the allocation of item 1 immediately after it arrives. However, the payment for the agents can be computed after two periods (i.e., after knowing how many items arrived).
A mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if irrespective of whether 1 or 2 items arrive, irrespective of bidder W 's reports, it is a dominant strategy for bidder V to report his true values for both the items at the beginning of the game, and vice versa. A mechanism is IR if similarly under no circumstances does the payment of an agent exceed her (reported) utility obtained by her allocation. Since we focus on DSIC mechanisms, we avoid different notation for bids and true values.
In most of the Lemma statements, we show that the allocation and payment functions are restricted in some ways. These restrictions apply to both x V (·, ·) and x W (·, ·), and similarly to both p V (·, ·) and p W (·, ·). However we prove the statements only for x V (·, ·) and p V (·, ·) as the corresponding proof for bidder W is identical. All missing proofs are in Appendix A.
DSIC + IR Mechanisms
In this section, we show necessary conditions for a deterministic online mechanism to be DSIC and IR. These conditions are very similar to characterizations for the offline case [9, 31] . Essentially, what this amounts to is that every DSIC+ IR mechanism looks like this from the point of view of V : the two items are offered at prices π 1 (w) and π 2 (w), that do not depend on v. In case V is allocated only one of the two items, he pays the corresponding price. We will deal with the case where she is allocated both items in the next part. In the next 3 lemmas, we only state the conclusion for V , and the symmetric statement for W is true as well. Lemma 1. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism, there must exist a threshold functions π 1 (w) such that:
Lemma 2. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism, there must exist a threshold functions π 2 (w) such that:
Lemma 3. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism, 
Finite Approximation
From now on, we assume that the mechanism also gets a finite approximation, and further refine the necessary conditions we have so far. Basically, we show finiteness and positivity of the thresholds, because of which 3 of the 4 regions in Figure 1 on page 6 are guaranteed to be non-trivial. Further we show that π 2 ≥ π 1 always, and when π 2 > π 1 these two thresholds together completely determine the allocation function for bidder V : in case he wins the first item, he is also allocated the second item if v 2 − π 2 > v 1 − π 1 , and his payment is only π 2 . If π 2 = π 1 , then in one of the 4 regions, namely B V R , the mechanism has the freedom to allocate to bidder V just item 1 or both items. This ambiguity in allocation is eliminated when π 2 > π 1 , and V does not get item 2 in B V R , and pays π 1 . All this is crucial when we construct the main argument in Section 2.3.
The next two lemmas follow by considering v, w values that would lead to unbounded approximations if the thresholds were either ∞ or 0. Once again, for Lemmas 4-8, we only state the conclusion for V and the symmetric statement for W holds as well.
Lemma 4.
For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor, 1. It always allocates item 1.
∀w ∈ R 2
+ , we have π 1 < ∞. Further, ∀w ∈ R 2 + : w 1 > 0, we have π 1 > 0.
Lemma 5. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor, ∀w ∈ R 2 + : w 1 > 0, we have π 2 < ∞.
Notation. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor, the following four sets are well defined. Fix a bid w ∈ R 2 + : w 1 > 0 of bidder W . By Lemma 4, such a mechanism has π 1 > 0, and thus the domain of π 2 , namely [0, π 1 ) × R 2 + is non-empty. Thus the value of π 2 is well-defined for any fixed w ∈ R 2 + , making the 4 sets below well-defined. Further both π 1 and π 2 are finite, making B V L finite and the other 3 sets non-empty. We will use the non-emptiness of T V R later in the proof.
The names are meant to be indicative of which portions of the positive quadrant of bidder V 's type space these sets occupy. Similarly, fixing a bid v ∈ R 2 + : v 1 > 0 of bidder V , we define four sets in the type space of bidder W :
We drop the arguments when it is clear from the context, i.e., we say T V R instead of T V R (w). Given that these regions are non-trivial, Lemma 6 shows that V gets both items in T V R , Lemma 7 shows that π 2 ≥ π 1 and Lemma 8 shows that she doesn't get item 2 in B V R when π 2 > π 1 .
Lemma 6. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor,
For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor, ∀w ∈ R 2 + : w 1 > 0, we have π 2 (w) ≥ π 1 (w).
Lemma 8. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor,
At this point, it is convenient to summarize our findings on how the threshold functions π 2 and π 1 almost entirely determine the allocation for bidder V (and similarly φ 1 and φ 2 for bidder W ). We do this in the following corollary. Except for the region B V R , the threshold functions π 2 and π 1 completely determine the allocation function for bidder V . In the region B V R , bidder V could receive just item 1 or both items. Even in B V R , when π 2 > π 1 , bidder V can just receive item 1.
Corollary 9. Fix any w ∈ R 2 + : w 1 > 0. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor, the allocation in the regions B V L , B V R , T V L , T V R should satisfy the following:
Analogous characterization holds for
B W L , B W R , T W L , T W R .
H approximation
Now, we assume that the mechanism gets an H approximation for some fixed number H. Using this we argue that in a particular region of the type space, the mechanism must allocate both items. Using this along with the necessary conditions we have so far, we eventually arrive at a contradiction, implying that deterministic DSIC + IR mechanisms cannot get any finite approximation. We restrict our attention to the following subset of R 2 + , for some N ≥ H and < 1 H .
Lemma 10. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets an H approximation, ∀N ≥ H, ∀ < 1 H , ∀w ∈ S N, , we have that
2. If further, v 1 < H , then Item 2 is always allocated.
Proof. For any mechanism that gets an H-approximation, if item 2 doesn't arrive, it is necessary that the mechanism allocates item 1 to bidder V when v 1 ≥ H given that w 1 < . For the second point, we have that w 1 < and v 1 < H , while w 2 ≥ H. Thus not allocating item 2 to any bidder at all results in an approximation factor of at least H since we have < 1 H . Lemma 11. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets an H approximation,
Proof. Consider any two points w, w ∈ S N, . We show that any mechanism that gets an H approximation has π 2 (w) − π 1 (w) = π 2 (w ) − π 1 (w ) for all such w and w .
1. Suppose not. Assume without loss of generality that π 2 (w) − π 1 (w) < π 2 (w ) − π 1 (w ).
2. Note that max{π 1 (w), π 1 (w )} < H from Lemma 10. This and Point 1 above imply that there exists a point v s.t.
3. Such a point v is included in B V R (w ) and in T V R (w). Based on our characterization in Corollary 9 such a point v gets allocated the set of items {1, 2} (i.e., both the items) when bidder W bids w and just {1} when bidder W bids w .
• The astute reader might point out "Corollary 9 says that the allocation in region B V R (w ) could be {1} or {1, 2}, and it is {1} whenever π 2 (w ) > π 1 (w ). Do we know that π 2 (w ) > π 1 (w ) to draw this unambiguous conclusion about allocation being {1} in B V R (w )? The answer is yes. To see this, note that by Lemma 7 π 2 ≥ π 1 at both w and w . The only question is whether π 2 (w ) > π 1 (w ) or not. But w.l.o.g. we assumed that π 2 (w) − π 1 (w) < π 2 (w ) − π 1 (w ). This immediately shows that π 2 (w ) > π 1 (w ).
4. Correspondingly, the allocation for bidder W when changing his bid from w to w changes from ∅ to just {2} or ∅ to ∅. To see this note that when V gets {1, 2} clearly W gets ∅. But when V gets {1}, the bidder W could have possibly gotten {2} or ∅. Note that W getting ∅ means that item 2 didn't go to any bidder at all.
5. But the possibility of item 2 not going to any bidder at all is ruled out by Lemma 10: note that w 1 < and v 1 < H . Given that item 2 should always be allocated, the only possible change of allocation for bidder W when changing his bids from w to w is from ∅ to {2}.
6. Based on the definition of the 4 sets it follows immediately that when w 2 is held a constant and w 1 is varied, the point w moves either between B W L and B W R or between T W L and T W R , or between T W L and B W R .
7. Our characterization in Corollary 9 shows that none of the three moves mentioned above can result in an allocation change between ∅ and {2}. Indeed an allocation change between ∅ and {2} requires a move between B W L and T W L , which is not among the three moves mentioned above.
Lemma 12. For every deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism that gets an H-approximation, 
Proof. Consider any two points w, w ∈ S N, . We show that any mechanism that gets an H-approximation has π 1 (w) = π 1 (w ) and π 2 (w) = π 2 (w ) for all such w and w . Suppose not.
1. Lemma 11 says that π 2 (w) − π 1 (w) = π 2 (w ) − π 1 (w ). This means that either π 2 (w ) > π 2 (w) and π 1 (w ) > π 1 (w), or π 2 (w ) < π 2 (w) and π 1 (w ) < π 1 (w). W.l.o.g. we assume that we are in the former case, namely, π 2 (w ) > π 2 (w) and π 1 (w ) > π 1 (w).
2. The former statement implies that there exists a point v ∈ R 2 + such that π 1 (w) < v 1 < π 1 (w ) and π 2 (w) < v 2 < π 2 (w ), and v 2 − v 1 > π 2 (w) − π 1 (w). We also have max{π 1 (w), π 1 (w )} < from Lemma 10.
3. Such a point v is included in T V R (w) and B V L (w ). Thus, as the bid of bidder W changes from w to w , by Corollary 9, the allocation of bidder V for such a point v changes from {1, 2} (while in
4. Correspondingly, the allocation for bidder W when changing his bid from w to w could have changed from ∅ to ∅, or ∅ to {1}, or ∅ to {2} or ∅ to {1, 2}. From Lemmas 4 and 10, we should always allocate both items for the bid ranges we have considered. Thus, the only possible allocation change for bidder W as his bid changes from w to w is from ∅ to {1, 2}. has an allocation of {1, 2} only when φ 2 = φ 1 . The point w being in B W L and w in B W R means that w 1 < φ 1 = φ 2 < w 1 . But note that w 1 , w 1 < , where as w 2 = w 2 ≥ H >> . On the other hand since w ∈ B W L it means that φ 2 > w 2 ≥ H. It is impossible to have the following conditions satisfied:
• w 2 = w 2 ≥ H and 0 < w 1 , w 1 < • w 2 < φ 2 and w 1 < φ 1 = φ 2 < w 1 7. This means that our contrary assumption can't hold. This proves the Lemma, namely, π 2 (w) = π 2 (w ) and π 1 (w) = π 1 (w ).
Theorem 13. No deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism gets a finite approximation factor Proof. From Corollary 9 it is intuitively clear that once π 2 (w) and π 1 (w) are determined, they almost entirely determine the allocation function in the type-space of bidder V . But now Lemma 12 (basically Equation 2) shows that π 2 and π 1 remain unchanged when w moves in the set S N, . This therefore means, when w moves in the set S N, , the allocation to bidder V for any given bid v ∈ (0, H ) × R + (except for the indifference points in the boundary region) remains unchanged. The allocation of bidder W , which is simply the complement of allocation to bidder V also remains unchanged therefore, as w moves in S N, . This leads to an unbounded approximation factor. We will now make this formal by first showing the following.
1. For any set S of w's where π 2 (w) and π 1 (w) remain unchanged, let Q(S) = {v ∈ R 2 + :
} be the set excluding the indifference points in bidder V 's type space (the π's are defined w.r.t. some arbitrary w ∈ S). The allocation for indifference points could swing arbitrarily as w moves and therefore we will not focus on them. We show that:
we have:
To prove Equation 3 , note that Corollary 9 says that the only region in bidder V 's type-space where π 2 and π 1 don't accurately determine the allocation functions for bidder V is the region B V R where the allocation could be {1} or {1, 2} in the case where π 2 = π 1 . Except for this region, since π 2 and π 1 entirely determine the allocation of bidder V , Equation 2 directly implies Equation 3 . We now show that this corner case of π 2 = π 1 can't happen by proving that
To see this, note that it is necessary that π 2 ≥ 1 because otherwise, the approximation ratio for giving away item 2 with w 2 ≥ 2H to bidder V with v 2 < 1 is at least
2H
1+ > H (the in the denominator is for capturing item 1's welfare of at most ). On the other hand, as discussed in point 2 of the proof of Lemma 11, we have π 1 < H < 1. Thus π 1 < 1 ≤ π 2 , eliminating the corner case we hoped to remove.
2. Notice that the allocation to bidder W is simply the complement of allocation to bidder V because the mechanism allocates both items, according to Lemmas 4 and 10. Thus,
Equation 4 leads to an unbounded approximation factor. To see this, consider the S 2H, = {w ∈ R 2 + : 0 < w 1 < , w 2 = 2H}. Fix a v s.t. v 1 = H 3/2 (if such a v 1 happens to be a boundary point w.r.t. S 2H, , pick a v 1 arbitrarily close to that point). Equation 4 implies that for all w ∈ S 2H, , we have
Then consider a point (w 1 = H 3 , w 2 = 2H), and focus on the case where item 2 never arrives. Giving item 1 to bidder W results in approximation factor of This means that a deterministic DSIC+IR mechanism cannot obtain a H-approximation for any H. This proves the theorem. Proof of Lemma 4. Consider a mechanism that gets a finite approximation factor H, and consider the case where item 2 does not arrive. If for some v, w, the mechanism does not allocate item 1, then the approximation factor for the mechanism is unbounded.
If at some w the mechanism had π 1 = ∞, let v 1 = (H + 1)w 1 . In this case, bidder V still doesn't get the item, making the approximation factor to be H + 1 which is larger than H.
If for some w : w 1 = 0, the said mechanism had π 1 = 0, let v 1 = w 1
H+1
. In this case bidder V still gets the item, making the approximation factor to be H + 1 which is larger than H.
Proof of Lemma 5. Fix a w ∈ R 2 + : w 1 > 0. By Lemma 4, note that 0 < π 1 < ∞ for such a w. Suppose π 2 = ∞ for the said point w. Now, consider a point v s.t. v 2 >> max{v 1 , w 1 , w 2 } and v 1 < π 1 . At such a v, item 2 should necessarily go to bidder V for a finite approximation. Having π 2 = ∞ implies this will not happen.
Proof of Lemma 6. To prove the allocation part, fix a w with w 1 > 0, and consider a v ∈ T V R . For any such v, by Lemma 1 x V 1 (v, w) = 1. Suppose, x V 2 (v, w) = 0. Then bidder V with value v ∈ T V R , has an incentive to report a v ∈ T V L . By Lemma 2, such a report earns the bidder a utility of v 2 − π 2 which, by the definition of T V R , is strictly larger than his current utility of v 1 − π 1 . To see that his current utility is v 1 − π 1 note that when a bidder gets only item 1, by Lemma 3 he has to pay π 1 .
To prove the payment part, fix a w and consider a v ∈ T V R . Since we just showed that all v ∈ T V R have x V 1 (v, w) = x V 2 (v, w) = 1, it follows from DSIC that p V (v, w) for all v ∈ T V R must be the same, say p. We know from Lemma 2 that for all v ∈ T V L we have p V (v, w) = π 2 . We claim that this immediately implies that p = π 2 . Suppose on the contrary p = π 2 .
1. Say p > π 2 . Then v's in T V R with v 2 ≥ v 1 have an incentive to report in T V L to receive a utility v 2 − π 2 which is strictly larger than the utility v 2 − p they get currently.
2. And if p < π 2 , then v's in T V L have an incentive to report to a v in T V R with v 2 ≥ v 1 to a get a utility of v 2 − p which is strictly larger than the utility v 2 − π 2 they get currently. Therefore we have p V (v, w) = π 2 for all v ∈ T V R .
